Is Trump's foreign policy influenced by a TV series? (EN)

I have often wandered what may be the reasoning behind President Trump's foreign policy decisions, as they don't seem to follow a consistent pattern. Some seem purely transactional, while others are wholly unilateral; some appear very short-sighted, others potentially far-reaching; some look reckless, immature or extremely biased, others considerably more balanced. I'm not saying at all that these come in equal proportions! In my book most of his actions in international affairs are short-sighted, reckless, immature and biased. But the proportion is not the question here.

One can assume that, with his limited attention span, what counts most is who among his entourage gets his ear last before a decision is made - and the chaotic working methods and the frequent personnel changes at the White House might explain some of the inconsistencies. There were also reports that he gets easily triggered by certain TV talk-shows.
This is quite unsettling, as it leaves it unclear what this president is exactly standing for, what is the common thread in his foreign policy and how easily he can be influenced from random sources. If America's moves on the world scene are erratic and unpredictable, for allies as for adversaries, the consequences can be very serious.

But it's possible that Trump may have evolved to the next level: from being influenced by talk-shows, to being influenced by TV series.

AP report on secret CIA prison in Romania (EN)

More details here.

UPDATE: Huffington Post is running the same as its lead story, and with a more dramatic title:

Structure vs. entropy and the EU's slow undoing (EN)

There are many possible readings of history, and one of them is to see it as a continuous struggle to create structure, in the face of the ineluctable forces of entropy.

By structure I mean macro-level order, aggregation, alignment, unification, centralization; the structure is information-rich, the system is more complex than its parts. Think music (not necessarily good music). Think discipline.
By contrast, I use the short name of entropy for the absence (or looseness) of overall organization, for atomization, divergence, fragmentation, dissipation; an entropic system is information-poor (meaning, the system as a whole can be described through simple formulas and statistical randomness), but its different parts may have more intrinsic complexity. Think noise. Think freedom.


This dichotomy is of course over-simplified, and should not be understood as a value judgment; life is made of the duality of these forces. In some cases the macro-structure may be aimed at promoting harmony and stability; but at times it can also become a straitjacket, repressive of individual liberties. And there are several possible levels of aggregation (e.g. in terms of social order: community level, national, international/regional, global) that sometime go against each other: for instance, some people advocate for strong national states and against supra-national integration. Many conspiracy theories are predicated upon the alleged drive by secretive groups (such as the Freemasonry) to control the world and impose a global macro-order.


The story of the Tower of Babel suggests that beyond a certain level God dislikes the human effort towards aggregation; or perhaps - depending on whether you are a believer or not - that there is a natural limitation to how much a structure can extend before it collapses under its own weight. History can be seen as a recurrent attempt to build castles on quicksand; there are many examples of seemingly eternal macro-structures that eventually collapsed - from the Roman Empire to the Third Reich to the Soviet Union.


The last 60 years or so have seen consistent efforts to create macro-structures at the international or supra-national level. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, both the West and the Communist bloc were aiming at the ultimate aggregation of a world order based on their respective ideologies; the United Nations tried (rather successfully) to patch a global governance regime of sorts over the East-West dichotomy while also incorporating the 'non-aligned' nations; the collapse of communism two decades ago seemed at the time to open the way for a unified international system dominated by liberal democracies, and in which regional and global integration processes would converge.

But nowadays the tide has turned.

Revolt and martyrdom (EN)

Notwithstanding the attempts (sometimes rather pathetic, like this one) to make sense of the momentous developments in the Arab world, the events there (as I argued before) remain largely incomprehensible for many Westerners.

Among others, it is mind-boggling how the protests can continue for weeks in places like Syria or Yemen, in the face of atrocious repression by desperate governments clinging to power.

I would argue that any serious effort to understand what motivates such resilience of protests should look at the cultural and especially religious background of the Arab societies, which makes so many of their youth ready for martyrdom to a degree nowhere to be seen in our time anywhere in the (post-)Christian West. The Tunisian revolt was actually sparked by such a self-inflicted act of martyrdom.

Once the barrier of fear has been broken, the fact - reinforced with fresh examples on a weekly basis - is that Muslim youth in Arab countries are far more willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause, and this willingness is nurtured and sustained in time for a lot longer than one can even imagine nowadays in Western societies. And religion plays a huge role in this: Arab revolts are re-ignited every Friday by the prayer in mosques, they follow a ritualistic pattern as much as a political one.

How we understand history (EN)

The dramatic events in the Arab world over the past couple of months have captured the attention and imagination of mankind. But how do we understand the tectonic changes that are unfolding?

Reality is not easy to put into logical categories; it is often chaotic and incomprehensible, even more so in situations of conflict and social upheaval.
However, trying to understand what is going on by forming a narrative of the events is a very powerful human instinct: we simply are designed to function by making sense of reality, by projecting some sort of pre-formed mental coherence - usually in the form of a comforting narrative - on our environment and circumstances.
And sometimes the urge to take action may be just a symptom of mental insecurity due to lack of understanding, to a failure to make credible sense of reality. Thus, action becomes an effort to regulate reality by making it fit into an acceptable narrative.

From this viewpoint, the international military intervention in Lybia pushed for by France and Britain (with the US following with some reluctance) could also be read as a symptom of mental insecurity.

The writing on the wall, since the beginning of the Arab turmoil, has been the declining influence of the West, even in a strategically crucial region in its very backyard. Remember how the regional tsunami of social protests took the West by surprise, found it unprepared and eventually forced it to go along a change that it didn't expect, didn't want, and didn't quite understand (the ideas of freedom and people power that eventually gained prevalence on the positive side are just nuggets of understanding to offer some familiar, though precarious anchor to Western opinion in an ocean of unpredictability and incomprehensibility; same with fear of islamism on the negative side).
The decline of the West's global influence and the emergence of Asia is a long-term established trend, and the understanding of this trend has more recently started to sink in even in America and Europe (particularly after the financial crisis originated in the very center of the Western economic order); but the West's influence in the resource-rich North Africa and Middle East seemed well assured through a thick web of economic, political, historic and military links. By throwing this old certainty into question, the improbable awakening of the Arab street has in fact created much insecurity in the West.
And such insecurity calls for action. Decisive action.

Embracing the opportunity (and risks) of Arab democracy (EN)

As the authoritarian order in the Arab world is shaking in the face of popular uprisings that have broken through the socially entrenched fear barrier, an equally epic struggle is taking place in the West to come to terms with its own fears vis-a-vis the Arabs, and to comprehend the until recently unimaginable prospect of Arab democracy. 

For the West, the current dilemma is whether to embrace what looks like the chance of an unprecedented democratic opening in the Middle East (and, yes, with all the risks associated to it), or stick to the old comfort zone of familiar dictators who deliver "stability and security" in a volatile region.

This shouldn't be a dilemma at all.
For the "realist" position of privileging "stability" over change is riddled with inconsistencies and, in the longer term, breeds risks at least as serious than those associated with the alternative.

BBC journalism standards (EN)

You know that British etiquette is no longer what it used to be when the BBC gets someone to comment live on the G-20 Summit (pick one):

What's at stake in Kyrgyzstan (EN)

The slightly outlandish idea to establish a parliamentary republic in Kyrgyzstan has revived the debate about democracy and its chances to eventually take root in Central Asia, a region so far impermeable to political reforms and where monocentric, authoritarian regimes have been in control ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union two decades ago.

The rigid, pyramidal power structures of the -"stan" countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) feature an over-dominating executive, with the parliament and the judiciary in a subordinated role. The executive branch is in turn completely controlled by the president. No alternative centre of power is allowed to exist, no independent or autonomous authority. Stability is privileged over reform. Modernization is accepted only to the extent that it is limited to a purely technocratic agenda and does not undermine (and preferably reinforces) the status quo of the power structure.

Not surprisingly, Russia is not pleased with the turn of events. A democratic opening in its backyard is seen by the Kremlin as a recipe for trouble, especially given the highly strategically complex and volatile situation in Central Asia (suffice to say that Kyrgyzstan itself has the rare privilege of hosting both Russian, as well as American bases on its territory; a simple look at the map can speak volumes). Russia's interest is for stability, and stability in the mind of Russian leaders requires a strong hand at the helm; democratic experiments are seen as too big a risk.
And truth be said, Kyrgyzstan has not been a paragon of stability: the ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in the South, which almost derailed the 27 June constitutional referendum, followed shortly after the bloody uprising that toppled the latest strongman, Kurmanbek Bakyiev. Which itself was the second violent regime change in five years, after the "Tulip revolution" that overthrew Askar Akayev.

The new rulers, who initially formed a "provisional government", faced the conundrum of stabilizing the situation and resolving the issue of constitutional legitimacy at the same time. The parliament had been dissolved, the constitutional framework discontinued. Thus, the sense of urgency to proceed with the 27 June referendum, even under very adverse circumstances and notwithstanding the alarm bells sounded by international organizations (e.g. the International Crisis Group urging the government not to press ahead with the referendum in the immediate aftermath of ethnic clashes in the South).

The gamble seems to have paid off, as the referendum went ahead in a smoother way than expected. Incidentally, the country also got the first female president in the sub-region.
But Kyrgyzstan is far from being out of the wood yet. It is still engaged in a high-risk endeavor that could end either with a genuine Central Asian democracy (an oxymoron until very recently), or - admittedly more likely - with a failed state. There are not many options in between.

The stakes are very high not just for the mountainous landlocked country bordering China, but indeed for the West as well, and for the entire region.

Building an impossible future (EN)

Israel is currently locked in a losing battle with the rest of the world to assert an impossible vision.

The vision to which the current Israeli government committed itself is that Israel has an absolute and unquestionable right to do anything it deems necessary to secure itself - whatever the costs and implications, whatever the suffering and death that it inflicts on others. By refusing to accept limits and constraints to its actions, which are the very essence of civilization, it effectively behaves as a barbarian entity.

The battle to impose this vision is one that Israel cannot possibly win, and - as so many of its honest friends realize - one that will certainly turn it into a pariah state and may potentially lead to its destruction.

The latest blunder at sea is only the latest episode in a long series of - by now - familiar occurrences.

The Principle of Communicating Vessels (EN)

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UPDATE (25/03): Since I wrote this post, I noticed several comments (see here, also on BBC World yesterday) that getting healthcare reform out of the way has enabled Obama to adopt a tougher line with Netanyahu. I made my original comment in that respect (see below) hours before healthcare reform was voted in the House of Representatives. If anyone can find an earlier comment making this point, please let me know. Until then, I proudly claim the credit of being the first having noted this implication :)
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Though I have watched it passionately, I don't have any strong feelings about the substance of the debate on health insurance reform in the US. There are a lot of technicalities in the arguments that have been going back and forth; some of the objections from the conservative camp seem reasonable; it also seems odd for America not to be able to offer basic care to its sick, like virtually every other rich nation has been doing for a long time.

What gets me excited about this day is not the policy substance of healthcare reform, but the broader political significance of the moment. And its potential consequences for issues that I care a lot more about.

Suicide Bomber Comedy (EN)

Could humour be a more effective way to counter terrorism?



The above is a clip from the film Four Lions by Chris Morris. The "world's first suicide bomber comedy" will premiere later today at the Sundance Film Festival, where it's running for the World Cinema Narrative prize.
I haven't seen anything so hilarious in a long time. Can't wait to see the entire film :)

No Way Through (EN)

Bowing to Royalty (EN)

He did it again!
Why is Obama bowing to foreign monarchs? What message does this send? And why some in the US have a problem with this?

Critics say that by bowing the president forfeits American dignity and sends a message of weakness. Dick Cheney, who in 2007 shook the Emperor's hand without bowing, said that "There is no reason for an American president to bow to anyone. Our friends and allies don't expect it, and our enemies see it as a sign of weakness".

Supporters see the bows - or at least the latest one - as an expression of politeness and cultural sensitivity.

Interestingly enough, a large majority of Americans is not riled by Obama's bowing - in fact, a full two thirds (67%) approve, including a majority of Republicans (53%). And this nowhere else than in a Fox News Poll.

I'm pretty cool about the bows.

The Meaning of Abu Ghraib (EN)

My statement that the New Barbarians pose a bigger threat to the Western civilization than Al Qaeda (and also than islamic fundamentalism, nuclear proliferation, rogue states or any other external enemy) has raised some eyebrows. I will try to explain.

The point is not whether more Americans (or West-Europeans) and foreign civilians have perished or are at risk because of Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld policies (or those of their allies in Europe) than due to, say, terrorist attacks over the same period. While the case could be made, the point isn't about the body count. Rather, it's about the nature of the threat.

The New Barbarians (II) (EN)

So why is Obama getting the Nobel Peace Prize?
Most people I talked to are perplexed. Surely he hasn't done anything truly great so far, except maybe being the first non-white to win US presidential elections... but this is hardly a reason for being awarded the Nobel.

I have a different explanation, which starts eight years ago.

The New Barbarians (I) (EN)

The Western civilization is under attack, and in serious danger. And the most serious danger comes not from Al Qaeda-type terrorism, fundamentalist Islam, rogue states, nuclear proliferation or any other external factor. Rather, it comes from within, from people who profess to be its defenders. And who, in the name of defending the West's fundamental values violate them on a routine basis. People who think they can abolish the rules when it suits them, and reinstate them at will. Who think double standards are OK - e.g. you can unlawfully spy on your citizens or torture suspects and be a liberal democracy at the same time. Who think you can eat a cake and have it.

I call them the New Barbarians.