Back to tribalism: the implications of the West's toxic relation with Israel and what can still be done (EN)

On 7 October 2023 Israel suffered a horrendous terrorist attack from Gaza that led to around 1,200 people losing their lives and some 250 being taken hostage by Hamas. Since then, Israel has waged a devastating war on Gaza that turned into a genocide. However, this is not the focus of this post, as the characterisation of Israel's actions in Gaza has been debated by credible experts, relevant international organisations and courts, while the daily horrors occurring there are sufficiently available to those willing to know. Rather, this post attempts to outline, mostly from a Western perspective, the nature and broader implications of the West's relation with Israel in the current context.

1. From tribalism to universalism: a civilisational journey

Evolving from a tribal outlook, which is largely the default state through most of history, towards a form of universalism is the typical ascending evolution of a civilisation. For Western civilisation, this evolution from a clan / ethno-centric perspective to one that (in principle) provides a place for everyone has culminated with what we call liberal democracy. While it cannot be said that its ideals have been fully attained in any given society, the model of liberal democracy has been the leading one globally in the aftermath of WW2 and in particular after the end of the Cold War, and has largely shaped the system of international relations and institutions since then.

It is fair to acknowledge, however, that liberal democracy - not just as a lived reality, but also as a model - is increasingly contested in the West itself, and for various reasons has lost at least in part its attraction for the rest of the world, which has been a main source for Western soft power. While the reasons for this decline and loss of attraction, particularly visible after the financial crisis of the late 2000s, would merit a separate discussion (they can range from botched globalisation to increasing inequality to woke excesses or even imperial overreach), what can be said here is that the 'traditionalists', 'illiberals' and other populist types who claim to revive Western civilisation by reconnecting it to its roots are in fact regressives who want to walk back from universalism to a more tribal, parochial outlook - and this regressive, backward-looking tendency is at the core of movements like 'Make America Great Again'.

2. Jews and universalism

Historically the Jews have been among, if not the main victim of tribalism, in the form of ethnic and religious intolerance. For over 2000 years, they have been - particularly in the West - the persecuted minority of choice, facing systematic discrimination, exclusion and recurrent pogroms, culminating with mass extermination in the Holocaust.

On the other hand, and perhaps not unrelated to the above, Jewish personalities have been essential contributors to Western civilisation, and in particular to its evolution towards universalism. Indeed, any intellectual history of liberal democracy and universalism is dense with Jewish enlightened thinkers. And certainly Jews - and indeed any persecuted minority - stand to benefit from universalism, as illustrated by their flourishing in liberal democracies (with the US a good example). 

The flip side of the above is that a departure from universalism and a regression towards tribalism and intolerance is a direct threat to the Jewry worldwide. Increasing antisemitism in Western societies is the 'canary in the coal mine' with regard to such regression.

3. Is there such a thing as 'Judeo-Christian' civilisation?

Western supporters of Israel regularly emphasize that Israel is a bulwark of Western civilisation and often label this common civilisation as 'Judeo-Christian'. This rhetoric - exemplified below with US Representative Randy Fine (R-FL) and US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee - is used to emphasize the enduring bond between Israel and the West and more specifically to justify full and unconditional support by the West to Israel. 

This is not neutral historical, philosophical or theological commentary, but extremely loaded political rhetoric that requires unpacking, starting with the very 'Judeo-Christian' label, which is historically recent (forged in the 1930s) and misleading in a number of ways. 

First, because in the liberal democratic order built by Western civilisation the place of religion is fundamentally different (and less central) than in traditional societies. Therefore applying to contemporary Western civilisation this religion-focused label intrinsically denotes historical regression rather than a current and future-oriented perspective.

Second, the term 'Judeo-Christian', by this very juxtaposition, projects the image of a natural bond and continuity between Judaism and Christianity, and of historical closeness of Jews and Christians. None of these is factually true. From a religious point of view, there is clearly more rupture than continuity between the two faiths. This is particularly salient in terms of tribalism vs universalism: Judaism is largely ethno-centric (Jews are the 'chosen people'), while Christianity brings a radically different, universal message to humanity. For Christians the New Testament explicitly supersedes, not just complements the Old Testament. 

And if we look at history we see that Jews have been persecuted by Christians on a large scale for many centuries, and scapegoated for all kinds of misfortunes (from epidemics to natural disasters) occurring in traditional societies; so the historical perspective evoked by the 'Judeo-Christian' label in fact cancels the very wished-for togetherness (which instead is enabled by contemporary liberal democracy). 

In brief, 'Judeo-Christian' is a recent, ideologically loaded concept that doesn't have a solid base in history or religion and projects a regressive perspective on Western civilisation. But it's precisely this regressive perspective that Israel promotes.

4. Israel as a driver of regression towards tribalism

While Israel is routinely presented as an outpost of Western civilisation and democracy in a part of the world dominated by regressive, authoritarian regimes, the country is fundamentally set-up as an ethno-centric state, based on settler colonialism and apartheid (with many similarities to the former apartheid regime in South Africa). As such, it can at most be linked to a historically outdated pattern of the Western civilisation, one that the collective West has been striving to overcome in recent generations, not to universalist values - such as equal rights - embedded in liberal democracy.

Israel's conduct in Gaza since October 2023, as well as the political rhetoric around it make it glaringly obvious that the policies of the current Israeli regime are not aligned, but rather in stark contrast with the universalist values of liberal democracy. It is not by chance that mainstream public opinion in Western democracies grows increasingly critical of Israel, nor is it by chance that the current Israeli regime finds support among the far-right parties, nazi sympathisers and illiberal ideologues in the West; this apparent paradox alone should give serious pause.

Israel's actions in Gaza directly undermine the world's - and in particular the West's - 'never again!' pledge made in the aftermath of the Holocaust, and drive a regression towards tribalism and intolerance - which, incidentally, is particularly ominous for Jewish people around the world (see point 2 above).

5. The West's toxic relation with Israel

Its relations with the West have been essential for Israel since its inception as a state. Indeed, without strong political backing and multi-dimensional support from the West, including financial and military, Israel would have had a hard time to maintain itself in an admittedly hostile region. The US, the UK and Germany in particular are strongly committed and unconditional supporters to Israel. Leading politicians in these and other Western countries rarely miss an opportunity to affirm and reaffirm their commitment to Israel.

But as Israel more and more obviously looks like an ethno-centric, colonial apartheid regime rather than a liberal democracy, and turned from an underdog into a regional hegemon and bully, Western support has also changed nature from a lifeline to an enabler. And in the context of the events unfolding in Gaza, the relation between Israel and the West has grown particularly toxic in many respects. 

On the one hand, by providing unconditional support and diplomatic cover, the West has contributed to building a sense of entitlement, omnipotence and impunity for Israel. This has encouraged overreach, has created political space for radical, maximalist agendas to the detriment of more balanced and pragmatic approaches, and in time has shifted the overall Israeli public discourse to a kind of generalised lunacy that bodes ill for the country's future. Many actions and statements from Israeli politicians and public figures appear shocking and completely unhinged to most of the outside world, but have been completely normalised inside the Israeli bubble. This growing rift would not be possible without the West's enabling of Israel over a sustained period of time, including during the Gaza genocide. It's to a significant extent due to the West's full, unconditional backing that Israel has lost its bearings. And this builds a major threat to the long-term viability of the Israeli state, because the total support of the West for Israel will not be there forever - not only public opinion about Israel is rapidly souring, but there are clear signs of a generational shift in both US and Europe, with the young generations much less inclined than the older ones to unconditionally support Israel. Hence, the time when Israel on its own will have to reckon with the consequences of its actions and with the region's realities, grievances and interests is approaching.

On the other hand, the outsized influence, and sometimes outright control that Israel exerts on Western politics, longtime a taboo topic in the West, has become extremely visible in recent months and is increasingly scrutinised and questioned. The levers of this influence are largely untransparent (one can see a parallel with similarly surreptitious influence that Russia had, at least until its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, on key politicians in the West). What is clear is that there is a growing fracture between public opinion and the political class when it comes to Israel. In this context, the authorities' response is growing increasingly authoritarian and repressive, sometimes actually using Israeli technologies for societal surveillance, control and repression. Equating criticism of Israel's policies with antisemitism, as now embedded in law in several countries, is a particularly pernicious act: not only it stifles democratic debate and free speech, but it also associates all Jews - many of whom are opposed - to Israel's actions. Equating peaceful protest against genocide with terrorism is just as absurd and dangerous. These trends are profoundly damaging to Western democracies and - if not reversed soon - are bound to have a long-lasting impact.

Not least, by enabling and associating itself with Israel's actions in Gaza, the West is betraying the very international rules-based order that it worked over generations to put in place, is outright sabotaging international institutions that it painstakingly helped create, is abandoning its universalist claim and liberal democratic values, and sacrificing its soft power and its credibility with the Global South. It ultimately degrades its political system and accelerates its own regression towards tribalism and power politics. 

In a nutshell, the costs in historical terms for the West - political, economic, societal, intellectual - from getting entangled into the Gaza genocide are just staggering and cannot be justified going forward. As to Israel, the false sense of impunity enabled by the West's full and unconditional support is stoking a painful, possibly existential reckoning in the future, when the West's support will be withdrawn. 

5. What can the West still do

Way too many people have died in Gaza and tragically it may already be too late to save many of those still alive. Israel itself has largely exhausted its remaining capital of international goodwill and will hardly ever again be seen as the victim. And way too much damage has been done to Western democracies, their stance in the world, to our societies and psyche, and to the international system that we used to call 'rules-based'. 

Changing course is very urgent if the West is to retain a chance to save itself from being completely dragged down into and a spiral of civilisational regression and into global discredit by its current association with Israel's actions. 

On covid-19, the recklessness of UK's politicians poses a continued threat to Europe (EN)

Notwithstanding its successful vaccination campaign (which has been often put in contrast to EU's comparatively sluggish record), the United Kingdom is currently suffering another wave of the coronavirus pandemic, driven by the very contagious 'delta' (a.k.a. 'Indian') variant.

How this came to be is well known, and clearly linked to political decisions made by the UK Government. But the consequences could be very dire for continental Europe.

Indeed (see map below), the countries in the EU currently most affected by the new surge in cases are exactly those who recently welcomed UK tourists with few restrictions or none at all: Portugal and Spain. From there, as recent history demonstrates, it's only a matter of time before the fresh pandemic wave sweeps across the continent.

After last spring's third wave of covid-19 in Europe was driven by the 'alpha' variant of the virus that originated in England, it's now the second time in half a year that the UK is the gateway for a pandemic wave affecting the continent. The main explanation for this recurrent hazard is the continued recklessness in managing this health crisis by the British authorities.

And nor is it set to end.

The distance between what the UK thinks of itself and how others judge it (EN)

Here is UK's anticipation before last night's Eurovision song contest:

And here are the final results:

So the competitor from the UK was hoping to win... and he came out last with nil (zero!) points.

It's not easy at all to score a clean zero points in an Eurovision contest. Still, the UK has managed this feat twice, and it's the fifth time it has come last.

Sure, you can consider Eurovision - as I do - a largely pointless jamboree with little relation to the quality of the music. Still, as the ranking of each competitor is determined in good part based on voting by the public from the other countries, such extreme results are not irrelevant. And the point I'm making here is not about Eurovision, but about the UK.

Presedintele Iohannis spune ca Romania sta "extrem de bine" cu vaccinarea anti-covid, dar realitatea este alta (RO)

 Anuntul triumfalist de ieri al presedintelui Iohannis cum ca, spre deosebire de multe alte tari, Romania sta "extrem de bine" in privinta campaniei de vaccinare anti-covid este inselator.

Exista un singur aspect la care Romania este acum intr-o situatie mai buna decat alte tari europene, si anume faptul ca a obtine un vaccin a ajuns sa fie mult mai usor: nu mai exista conditii de varsta sau de comorbiditate, nu mai este nevoie de programare prin sistemul centralizat, pur si simplu oamenii se pot prezenta spontan la centrele de vaccinare deschise, exista destule doze de vaccin pentru toti.

Fara indoiala, acesta este un lucru foarte important din punctul de vedere al individului care isi doreste vaccinul. In tarile occidentale, programarile sunt inca restrictionate pe categorii de varsta, de exemplu tinerii fara anumite comorbiditati mai au de asteptat, posibil chiar luni intregi.

In schimb, din punctul de vedere al situatiei vaccinarii si al obiectivelor ei asumate (atingerea unei imunitati colective a populatiei si prevenirea sau atenuarea semnificativa a viitoarelor valuri ale pandemiei), Romania sta foarte prost comparativ cu alte tari europene. Iar succesul relativ in disponibilitatea vaccinurilor pentru cei doritori mascheaza de fapt o mare problema, care este pe cale sa duca la esecul campaniei de vaccinare.

Pentru a lamuri situatia, este suficient sa privim indicatorii-cheie ai progresului vaccinarii in tarile Uniunii Europene.

Este Romania prea rigida in administrarea dozei a doua de vaccin anti-covid? Statistici, explicatii, interpretari... (RO)

Romania a inceput relativ bine campania de vaccinare anti-covid, fiind de-a lungul lunii feburarie printre primele tari din UE ca numar de doze de vaccin administrate la suta de locuitori. Dar la sfarsitul lunii februarie a franat brusc ritmul vaccinarii, fiind ajunsa din urma de media UE. A mers apoi in pas cu media UE pana in ultima saptamana a lunii martie, cand Romania a inceput sa ramana tot mai mult in urma mediei la dozele administrate - nu ca ar fi incetinit, ci pentru ca celelalte tari au accelerat semnificativ, in timp ce tara noastra a ramas intr-o viteza 'de croaziera' de cca. 55.000 de doze de vaccin administrate zilnic (spre comparatie, Franta, care a inceput mult mai incet in ianuarie, a ajuns recent la peste 500.000 de doze pe zi, cu o populatie doar de 3 ori si jumatate mai mare decat a Romaniei).

Graficul de mai jos al numarului de doze de vaccin administrate la suta de locuitori ilustreaza aceasta evolutie in trei acte: Romania deasupra mediei UE in februarie, in pas cu media UE in martie, si ramanand din ce in ce mai mult in urma de atunci.

Aceasta ramanere in urma nu este deocamdata dramatica. Chiar daca Romania este acum printre tarile din UE cele mai intarziate cu vaccinarea, inca nu a pierdut contactul cu plutonul si mai poate recupera daca accelereaza campania de vaccinare in perioada urmatoare, mai ales ca in tara au intrat pana acum doze destule (cu peste 2 milioane mai multe decat numarul dozelor deja administrate). Penuria de vaccinuri, care s-a manifestat acut in februarie, nu mai este acum o problema - exista doze suficiente pentru a accelera semnificativ vaccinarea.

Dar exista o diferenta in campania de vaccinare din Romania fata de alte tari UE care merita discutata, pentru ca ar putea avea implicatii importante in depasirea mai rapida, sau dimpotriva, agravarea si prelungirea actualului val al pandemiei. 

Diferenta dintre Romania si 'mainstream-ul' european este ilustrata de faptul ca, desi se afla sub media UE la numarul de doze administrate (raportat la populatie), Romania este totusi sensibil peste media UE la proportia celor complet vaccinati (care au primit ambele doze de vaccin):

Cu alte cuvinte, Romania a administrat mai putine doze de vaccin la suta de locuitori, dar are mai multi complet vaccinati (adica a administrat a doua doza in proportie mai mare decat media UE).

Care este explicatia acestui aparent paradox si ce inseamna acest lucru?

Cutting through the noise on vaccines, some counter-intuitive truths (EN)

Without false modesty, this blog has been ahead of the curve on the AstraZeneca (AZ) covid vaccines affair. It exposed almost two months ago the arrogant lies of Pascal Soriot, AZ's CEO, in his attempts to bamboozle the EU into accepting that it should be treated as a second-class client, hinted at the likely foul play by the UK Government and at the toxic mix with Brexit politics. By March, statements made here - e.g. on the de facto vaccine export ban instituted by the UK or on the need to limit exports to ensure that AZ is serving fairly its EU contract - were part of the line taken by senior EU officials, such as European Council President Charles Michel, or European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. 

On the other hand, this blog didn't hesitate to call out the ineptitude of some national leaders' comments on the AZ vaccine and of some national regulators' decisions on its roll-out - a stupidity compounded by last week's temporary suspension of the vaccine in almost half of the Member States, based on mainly political considerations, in spite of the advice of EU's own regulator. And it also criticised the Commission's short-lived intention to invoke Art.16 of the Northern Ireland protocol as a very consequential political gaffe, which gave a pretext for the UK to try to wriggle out of its legal obligations.

As the vaccine-related escalation between the EU and the UK is now in full swing, the ongoing war of narratives creates a lot of noise that can easily distract from the fundamentals. It's therefore timely to take a step back, look at the bigger picture and scratch a bit the surface to bring up some rather counter-intuitive insights. 

I will try to argue that:

• the AZ (and broader covid vaccines) scandal is more of a political stake than an actual public health issue; 
• in the medium term the EU's problem is not the shortage of vaccines, but a very different one;
• UK's apparent triumph on the vaccines is far from vindicating Brexit, rather the contrary; and 
• the EU is very well positioned for success in the longer term, but only if it manages to overcome its existential challenges in the short term.

Can vaccination prevent new lockdowns in Europe? (EN)

Back in January, in the second part of this post, I anticipated that EU countries were facing an imminent, devastating third wave of the pandemic over the coming months, driven by the more contagious mutations of the virus. I also wrote that the vaccines roll-out, even if proceeding according to plan (which it hasn't, mainly due to AstraZeneca's failure to supply on its contract with the EU), would not be able to help flatten the curve - they were simply too little, too late for this wave.

In the meantime, much of the talk in Europe has been about gradually lifting restrictions introduced at the beginning of winter. 

But one and a half month later, as more and more countries see again their infections and deaths going up again (below figure from ECDC) and their hospitals under strain, the tone is changing and re-confinement is back on the table across Europe.

The lingering question is: would a faster vaccination have helped significantly mitigate this new wave of the pandemic, so as to avoid renewed lockdowns? 

It's a legitimate question, especially as one compares with the UK, which, having achieved a much higher vaccination rate than continental Europe, is seeing its case count fall and is preparing to emerge from lockdown.

And linked to this, what is the level of vaccination where one can hope to see, if not 'herd immunity' (which we know requires around 70% of people to be immune), at least a meaningful impact on the virus propagation, a noticeable 'flattening of the curve' without the need for tough lockdown-type restrictions?

By looking at the available evidence from different countries with different levels of vaccination and at different points in the pandemic wave, the answer to the first question is, sadly, that even a flawless vaccination rollout wouldn't have avoided the need for fresh lockdowns in Europe.

The answer to the second question is more complicated and depends on a number of other factors (e.g. how many people in a given country already have some immunity after having been infected with covid in the earlier waves), but it points to a level of vaccination that EU countries are very unlikely to reach before summer. So if vaccination can help Europe re-open safely and broadly, this might only be the case from next autumn.

As Britain's cheating on vaccines is revealed, the EU has a duty to react (EN)

There isn't much to add to CNN's revelations about UK's contract with AstraZeneca (AZ) for on covid-19 vaccines, but it's worthwhile summarising the main facts:

• The British authorities have been apparently trying to keep the deal with AZ as a national security secret, but inadvertently made it available online back in November last year.
• UK's contract with AZ is very similar to EU's contract, in particular with regard to the "best reasonable efforts" clause. 
• UK's contract with AZ is officially dated one day after EU's contract with the company.
• The British contract also mentions that vaccines can be delivered from production sites in the EU, just like the EU contract also lists production sites in the UK.

In brief: no significant difference between the two contracts, whether in respect to the "best reasonable efforts" clause, to the time of concluding the contracts (only a day's difference, with EU's the earlier one) or to the sourcing of the promised supply.

These are explosive revelations and the implications deserve a discussion.

On vaccines, Europeans are shooting themselves in the foot... again (EN)

After the European Commission's blunder on invoking - even briefly for a couple of hours last Friday - Article 16 of the Northern Ireland protocol, which offered a golden opportunity to the UK to pressure the EU into making further post-Brexit accommodations, the Europeans are again scoring an own goal in the vaccines saga.

This time it's not so much about Brussels, but about national leaders and authorities.

The decision by several countries (Germany, France, Portugal, Sweden, Austria, Poland, Belgium... and counting) to limit the use of the Oxford/AstraZeneca covid vaccine to those under 65 (or even under 55 in one country), compounded by statements such as this one by French president Emmanuel Macron, is a big mistake and an act of self-harm on many levels.

It is wrong on the facts. It undermines the EU vaccination strategy and the countries' own vaccination efforts. And it weakens the legal case that the EU has against AstraZeneca for non-performance of their contract to supply vaccines.

Who is the bully now? (EN)

Since I posted yesterday about the escalation of the covid vaccine row between the EU and the UK, events have taken an even uglier turn.

There is no doubt that the EU is on the defensive after its blunder Friday on the Irish border, even if it reversed it within hours (see a more elaborate explanation in my yesterday's post... not such an outrage really, but an extremely bad move politically). But the humiliation of the EU that is feasted in British media and partly across the continent these days doesn't serve any good purpose. It is mostly driven by schadenfreude and fundamentally wrong. And the righteousness and hypocrisy of the British establishment are becoming unbearable.

The EU is presented as the villain from having attempted - in the face of a desperate shortage due to pharma companies reneging on their commitments - to protect its EU-made contracted vaccine supplies from the diversion to other countries. Meanwhile, the UK itself is operating a de facto export ban on AstraZeneca (AZ) vaccines manufactured on its territory, pretending that it has a right to monopolize the supply because it signed a contract earlier, notwithstanding AZ's contractual obligation to also supply the EU from its UK-based factories.

It now transpires that in addition to AZ having shipped EU-made vaccines to the UK last year, Pfizer also has been sending significant quantities to the US, while both companies are failing to deliver to the EU on their contracts. The EU is thus punished not for being slow, but for having leveraged its collective bargaining power to obtain the cheapest prices.

The UK "generously" offers to allow AZ to deliver vaccines to the EU... once it has finished inoculating all its adult population, sometime in autumn. Meanwhile the EU is entering the third wave of the pandemic with very low immunisation rates due to a combination of a slow start vaccination process across its 27 member states and insufficient delivery by the vaccine providers - Pfizer and AZ.

Righteousness and hypocrisy are in even sharper display when it comes to the Irish border. The EU is universally condemned for having announced (and quickly reversed) the activation of Article 16 of the Norther Ireland protocol of UK's Withdrawal Agreement, with a view to prevent backdoor export of vaccines to the UK. But that Article 16 is part of the protocol - so invoking it cannot be construed in any way as a breach of the protocol. Again, as I also wrote yesterday, getting anywhere near Article 16 was a political gaffe... but certainly not an "incredible act of hostility" as Arlene Foster presented it. If invoking Article 16 amounts to a quasi-declaration of war, why was it stipulated in the protocol in the first place?

What was, indeed, an incredible act of hostility were the UK Government's plans, last year, to override the Northern Ireland protocol by creating a different and contradictory legal framework through its proposed Internal Market act (abandoned in the meantime).

But why would British politicians, especially on the tory and DUP side, feign unlimited outrage? Part of the motivation is to change the narrative from last year and present the EU rather than the UK as untrustworthy to uphold its commitments. But more importantly, because they want to use this opportunity to abolish the Northern Ireland protocol altogether and wriggle out of the agreement that they ratified. 

Who is the bully now?

Make no mistake: the public shaming of the EU for the sin of having stood up for itself in the covid vaccines scandal - admittedly having got it wrong politically and subsequently backpedaling on the issue of controlling the Irish border - is not a legitimate reaction born out of genuine outrage. It is a deliberate drive to humiliate and bully the EU in the context of post-Brexit politics, with the ultimate aim to vindicate Brexit.

The dangerous escalation between the EU and the UK on covid-19 vaccines (EN)

The snowballing developments over the past few days, after AstraZeneca (AZ) announced a significant cut in its scheduled supplies of covid-19 vaccine to EU countries, have escalated to a war-like rhetoric between the UK and the EU, a raid by Belgian authorities at the AZ production site in Seneffe and the introduction of export controls on EU-manufactured vaccines. What's happening, really, and where is this coming from?

The narrative in the media about these events has been so far surprisingly simplistic and one-sided - not just in British tabloids like The Daily Mail, but also in usually much more sober outlets like The Guardian or the BBC and in many continental newspapers. It basically says that, due to its well-known bureaucratic heaviness, the EU was late to pass contracts with vaccine suppliers, slow with approving and distributing the jabs for use in its Member States and ineffective in the whole set-up of the vaccination campaign, which is in shambles. By contrast, the UK has been much nimbler with both purchases and approvals and as a result is way ahead of continental Europe with its vaccination efforts. Faced with a shortfall in vaccine supply, the EU has been throwing its weight around and trying to bully Britain into surrendering its own stocks. 

It's fair to say that, at least for the time being, the EU is losing the narratives' war.

The actual story, however, might be considerably more complicated. 

In this post I will present an alternative interpretation, largely based on information in the public domain, but also in part on speculation since some pieces of the puzzles are still missing. The near future may shed light on these aspects.

In a nutshell, my hypothesis is that the escalation is not simply due to the EU bureaucrats having 'lost the plot', but rather provoked by the conduct of AZ and of its CEO (which has been the immediate trigger for the crisis) and by perceived foul play from the UK on a very sensitive, politically explosive issue. 

All parties have made mistakes and the situation is getting out of hand. The stakes are huge and the logic is increasingly that of a zero-sum game, which risks durably poisoning the post-Brexit relations.

A statistically sound way to count the death toll from covid-19 (EN)

Mr. Lemaitre lives in Brussels, Belgium. He is 70 and five years ago underwent surgery for lung cancer. In mid-February his carcinoma recurred and he was admitted to hospital. Subsequently his condition worsened and in the beginning of March he entered a coma. Less than a week later, his temperature spiked and he was tested for the novel coronavirus. By the time the result came back positive, Mr. Lemaitre had already passed away.

Mr. Peeters lives alone in rural Flanders. His age is the same, 70, and he has a chronic heart condition. But he is in decent health otherwise and he makes sure to regularly visit his cardiologist. Good monitoring, a healthy diet and a quiet lifestyle could easily give him 10-15 more years of quality life, said his doctor. At the beginning of March Mr. Peeters had a couple of bad days, but then was better. He didn't worry too much, it had happened several times in the past and the doctor had adjusted his treatment in response. He would anyway see his doctor in two weeks for his regular appointment.
As the days pass, Mr. Peeters begins to stress about the coronavirus epidemic. He knows he is in a vulnerable category, at his age and with his chronic heart disease, so he limits his contacts and spends most of the time indoors, watching the news. The epidemic is growing in his region, with more and more cases reported every day. He knows stressing is not good for his heart, but cannot help it. He has another bad day and he takes meticulous notes of all the symptoms, to tell his doctor when he sees him in a couple of days.
Then one day and a half before his scheduled appointment, the government on TV announces a lockdown, aimed at slowing the spread of the virus. All non-essential outings are banned. All regular medical appointments are canceled. Mr. Peeters panics. During the night, he has a heart attack and by dawn is dead in his bed.

While Mr. Lemaitre and Mr. Peeters both died at about the same time, only one of them died due to the coronavirus. Mr. Lemaitre was already on his deathbed when he contracted the virus; it might have accelerated his demise, but it certainly wasn't the primary cause. On the other hand, Mr. Peeters' death is obviously caused by the coronavirus pandemic, even if he might not even have been infected; indeed, were it not for the cancellation of his cardiology appointment and for the stress of the situation, chances are Mr. Peeters would be happily tending to his garden in the spring sun, and for years to come.

Still, in the figures announced in the news bulletins, it's Mr. Lemaitre's death that is counted among the victims of the virus, and not that of Mr. Peeters.

Both Mr. Lemaitre and Mr. Peeters are fictional characters, but you get the point. As a real life example, I could refer to the hundreds of people who died in Iran after drinking methanol based on the false belief that it would protect them from the virus. Does the pandemic play a role in their deaths? Most certainly, but you will not find them counted among its victims. Also forgotten will be the lives lost due to the economic collapse provoked by the lockdown measures to stop the pandemic.
The covid-19 statistics that so many of us follow daily, which make the media's frontpages and determine the policy responses of our governments, are flawed.
Different countries count fatalities in different ways and test to various extents for the virus. We have no clue how many people are infected, how many recovered without ever being tested, and we only make guesses as to the death rate. Official or quasi-official estimates are multiples of the headline confirmed figures. We scratch our head at the widely diverging death rates in Italy (very high) and Germany (very low) - but we don't even know whether the data is comparable, given the differences in testing and in counting fatalities.
For all the talk about the science's comeback, about evidence-driven policies, in this unprecedented crisis our leaders are to a large extent flying blind. And the stakes couldn't be higher. The measures being taken these days are historic: state of emergency, lockdowns, border closures, huge fiscal packages to keep the economy - and indeed the society - afloat. One would wish that the figures informing these decisions would be reliable, statistically sound.

But is there any way to have accurate estimates of the death toll of the coronavirus?
The answer is yes, and it was used before - but not yet in this crisis.

Is Trump's foreign policy influenced by a TV series? (EN)

I have often wandered what may be the reasoning behind President Trump's foreign policy decisions, as they don't seem to follow a consistent pattern. Some seem purely transactional, while others are wholly unilateral; some appear very short-sighted, others potentially far-reaching; some look reckless, immature or extremely biased, others considerably more balanced. I'm not saying at all that these come in equal proportions! In my book most of his actions in international affairs are short-sighted, reckless, immature and biased. But the proportion is not the question here.

One can assume that, with his limited attention span, what counts most is who among his entourage gets his ear last before a decision is made - and the chaotic working methods and the frequent personnel changes at the White House might explain some of the inconsistencies. There were also reports that he gets easily triggered by certain TV talk-shows.
This is quite unsettling, as it leaves it unclear what this president is exactly standing for, what is the common thread in his foreign policy and how easily he can be influenced from random sources. If America's moves on the world scene are erratic and unpredictable, for allies as for adversaries, the consequences can be very serious.

But it's possible that Trump may have evolved to the next level: from being influenced by talk-shows, to being influenced by TV series.

Europe's anti-Roma racism (EN)

Traditionally strongest in Central Europe (plenty of nasty examples from recent history in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic etc.), the anti-Roma racism has rapidly spread in Western Europe since the EU enlargement. I pass on France's forced expulsion of Roma (EC Vice-president V. Reding said it all when she compared it to anti-Jewish persecutions during WW II), to focus just on the recent case in Greece that sparked a new wave of hysteria across Europe.

Greek authorities find a blonde girl ("the blond angel") in a Roma family, and suspect she may be abducted. DNA tests confirm that she is not the biological offspring of her so-called parents. While they offer a story of informal adoption, they are put in jail and much of Europe is frantically looking for the real parents ("she looks Scandinavian" is the dominant opinion). Ancestral myths of children abductions by the Roma are revived. In Ireland, a blonde girl is taken away by authorities from her Roma family, only to be returned later when DNA tests confirm that she is indeed from that family (well, yes, there are blond Roma children occasionally, as can be easily checked in many Roma communities).
The cases multiply, and note what crude racial profiling is sufficient to trigger police action:
"The police seized the girl after receiving a tip about a blonde-haired, blue-eyed child who looked nothing like her family, the Sunday World reports." 


Eventually, the biological parents of the "blond angel" found in Greece are identified in Bulgaria, and confirmed by DNA tests. They are, well, dark-skinned Roma themselves; and they confirm the informal adoption story (true, the Roma are not so good with the paperwork).

So what will happen now? Will the Greek Roma family be released from prison, with apologies and perhaps some compensation? Will they be allowed to keep the little girl whom they raised as their daughter?

My guess is different:

A wake-up call (EN)

The shocking decision to impose a 'tax' on bank depositors in Cyprus will only reveal its full consequences in the coming days and weeks. The signs so far are ominous; bank runs and social unrest in the coming period cannot be ruled out.

But whatever happens, one thing is already clear: that the North/South, Centre/Periphery cleavage in the Eurozone and in the EU at large has become irreversible, a point of no return has been reached. It is no longer taboo to force periphery governments to bypass democracy, break their promises and even their countries' law, if the powerful creditors so desire. The existence of second-class countries in the EU, for long an unspoken reality, has been officially formalised. And, with it, the end of the EU as we once knew it.

Incidentally, the measure may be as stupid as it is abusive. But even if it works, by some miracle and against the evidence of EU-imposed policies so far in its Southern rim, the harm of breaking the promise of a united Europe made of equal citizens is already done.

Out of a sense of historical justice, I would be tempted to wish that countries who are now forcing Cyprus into this legalised theft of its citizens' savings would one day live through such an experience themselves. But no, this would be wrong in any circumstance, and two wrongs don't make a right. I don't wish any citizen of any country to face a situation of being robbed outright by his or her own government. As one who lived under a totalitarian regime, I know well the feeling of frustration and disempowerment that such arbitrariness can bring, and how big a blow it can be to citizenship and basic human dignity.

For Romania, a periphery country itself and chronically treated as second-class within the EU - largely due to a corrupt, self-interested political class - this should be a last-chance wake-up call.

Dosarul Schengen - mize si incordari (RO)

Subiectul aderarii la Acordul Schengen incinge din nou, in aceste zile, coabitarea politica damboviteana. Diferenta fata de precedentele esecuri pe aceeasi tema este schimbarea de roluri: daca in 2011 presedintele Basescu era cel care propunea realocarea banilor pentru securizarea frontierelor spre alte domenii si autoritatile se razboiau cu florile olandeze, iar anul trecut pe vremea asta puterea portocalie obstructiona Serbia cu bataie pe Schengen, acum guvernul USL - sustinut de o majoritate zdrobitoare in parlament - isi incordeaza muschii in fata Occidentului, in timp ce basistii critica prestatia puterii.

In ambele ipostaze, avem de-a face cu acelasi simptom, chiar daca actorii au fost re-distribuiti: vorbim de slabiciunea pozitiei externe a Romaniei (un tratament similar aplicat, sa zicem, Poloniei sau Cehiei ar fi greu de imaginat), combinata cu incapacitatea cronica a clasei politice de a se abtine de la demagogie si de a actiona unitar si disciplinat in chestiuni care tin de interesul national. Totul, pe fondul unei deteriorari generale a climatului european in chestiunea liberei circulatii (si nu numai), despre care am scris deja de mai multe ori.

Ce ar fi, totusi, de facut? Si cum poate fi judecata pozitia guvernului Ponta?

"DeBasificarea justitiei"? Nu, multumesc. (RO)

In contextul noului asalt politic asupra Justitiei, se vorbeste despre "debasificarea" ei, in sensul eliminarii unor sustinatori ai lui Basescu din conducerea institutiilor-cheie: CSM, Parchetul General, DNA.

Am fost si raman un critic acerb al lui Basescu, al sistemului de putere pe care l-a construit in ultimii ani, al felului in care si-a impus controlul asupra multor institutii ale statului, sau le-a subminat si marginalizat pe cele pe care nu le-a putut controla cu usurinta. Accept si premisa - destul de usor de sustinut cu argumente - ca influenta basista persista in unele structuri, inclusiv in Justitie. Este greu de ignorat cum, la apogeul confruntarilor politice din 2012, Parchetul a parut sa-si ia instructiunile din unele declaratii publice venite de la Basescu sau de la Monica Macovei.

Daca chestiunea "debasificarii Justitiei" s-ar fi pus anul trecut, n-as fi avut rezerve in a o sustine.
Sa nu uitam, dupa semi-esecul referendumului de demitere a lui Basescu (vot coplesitor pentru demitere, dar referendum nevalidat), alternanta democratica la putere a fost in real pericol. Jocul de poker al USL-ului cu demiterea presedintelui (despre care mi-am exprimat parerea la momentul respectiv) a dat apa la moara basistilor, dandu-le ocazia sa pozeze in - culmea ironiei! - aparatori ai statului de drept. Tabara basista, pentru un timp, a parut sa-si recapete partial suflul politic. Pana acolo incat Basescu a gasit tupeul sa declare ca este pregatit sa ignore inca o data votul electoratului la alegerile parlamentare, anuntand ca va refuza sa nominalizeze candidatul aliantei castigatoare la postul de prim-ministru.

Intr-un astfel de context, cu un Basescu hotarat sa se agate de putere chiar in lipsa oricarei legitimitati populare, amenintand fatis cu repetarea manevrelor anti-constitutionale din toamna lui 2009 (cand a impiedicat o majoritate parlamentara legitima sa acceada la guvernare) si in mod evident dispus sa faca uz de influenta subterana pe care o putea exercita asupra institutiilor de stat (vorbim nu doar de 'activarea' unor sustinatori infitrati politic in diferitele institutii, ci si, intre altele, de santajul unor oameni vulnerabili cu dosare furnizate de serviciile secrete - formula bine rodata de Basescu in ultimii ani), o operatiune de curatire a Justitiei de pionii otraviti care raspundeau la ordinele Cotrocenilor putea fi o idee buna. Era vorba, in fond, de o chestiune de viata si de moarte pentru democratia romaneasca - salvarea principiului ca ajungerea la putere si pastrarea puterii se decid prin votul popular la alegeri. Pentru un timp in 2012, masinaria puterii basiste a parut capabila sa rastoarne chiar acest element fundamental al libertatii noastre de dupa 1989 (asa cum deja o facuse, poate nu chiar atat de flagrant, in 2009). Scenariul puterii basiste rezistand impotriva votului popular cu ajutorul serviciilor secrete si al Justitiei infiltrate politic era intr-adevar unul de cosmar, pentru evitarea caruia "debasificarea Justitiei" putea fi un raspuns. Desigur, ramanea de vazut ce ar fi putut face USL-ul concret, fara a forta regulile jocului ca la tentativa esuata de a-l demite pe Basescu.

Dar ce inseamna "debasificarea Justitiei" acum, in 2013?

2012: un bilant (RO)

Anul care a trecut cred ca va ramane in istoria democratiei romanesti ca anul unei necesare schimbari de putere, dar si al zguduirii din temelii a subredei ordini institutionale a Romaniei post-comuniste. In 2013, urgenta ar trebui sa fie reconstructia solida si credibila a institutiilor democratice afectate de criza politica din ultimii ani, in particular de puseul din vara anului trecut. Fara o astfel de reconstructie, s-ar putea sa nu mai ramana nimic in picioare la urmatoarea viitura a vandalismului politic. Din pacate, nu vom putea conta pe clasa noastra politica pentru asta - ca de obicei, pare sa aiba cu totul alte prioritati.

Mai pe larg:

CCR si-a atins limitele, solutia trebuie sa fie politica (RO)

Decizia Curtii Constitutionale (CCR) de a amana cu mai mult de o luna verdictul privind validarea referendumului pentru demiterea presedintelui Romaniei, dincolo de motivele tehnice invocate (nevoia de verificare a listelor electorale), semnaleaza faptul ca institutiile statului nu pot fi folosite la infinit pentru rezolvarea conflictelor politice.

Clasa politica este responsabila sa creeze solutii politice pentru problemele tarii. La noi, dimpotriva, de ani de zile clasa politica nu creeaza solutii, ci creeaza ea insasi probleme, pe care apoi se asteapta sa le rezolve altii: justitia, administratia, CCR, Europa, electoratul s.a.m.d. In loc sa creeze optiuni, politicienii nostri creeaza incontinuu blocaje. In loc sa intareasca institutiile statului capabile sa arbitreze in astfel de situatii, ei le submineaza si le antreneaza in lupta lor politica.
Situatia nu dateaza din iulie 2012 - pentru reamintire, vedeti un exemplu din multele posibile aici (din mai 2010): este vorba de acelasi tip de fundatura prin griparea mecanismelor legale si institutionale de rezolvare a conflictului politic.Ce este nou de data aceasta este ca ambele tabere politice s-au dovedit la fel de incapabile de a produce solutii si la fel de dispuse sa tarasca tara, fara mila si discernamant, in rafuielile lor.

Este iluzoriu sa mai asteptam acum, dupa ani de "fragezire" politica a institutiilor statului, ca institutiile "independente" sa rezolve razboiul politic. Orice ar face ele, nici nu mai au - dupa ce au suferit asalturi politice repetate - credibilitatea si prestanta de a da solutii definitve si indiscutabile, si nici nu au garantia ca verdictele lor vor fi acceptate de ambele tabere politice. Stiu, este foarte dureros si grav ceea ce spun, dar sunt trei ani de cand - printre destui altii - atrag constant atentia asupra acestui pericol, lucrurile au ajuns deja foarte departe.

Pur si simplu, politicienii nu mai respecta institutiile statului si nu mai recunosc arbitrajul lor. Este simptomatic cum justitia e atacata permanent dintr-o parte sau alta, in functie de cazul zilei (in timp ce fiecare dintre taberele politice incearca s-o controleze), cum serviciile speciale au devenit subiect de dispute teritoriale intre fortele politice, cum CCR - departe de a fi ea insasi apolitica - este atacata si pusa sub presiune cand de USL-isti, cand de basisti  de la caz la caz.

In aceste conditii, pretentiile politicienilor ca institutiile statului sa faca curat acolo unde ei au creat o enorma mizerie sunt cel putin ipocrite. In realitate, avand exercitiul incalecarii politice a institutiilor, nici una dintre taberele politice nu este dispusa sa accepte decat deciziile care ii sunt convenabile.

De aceea, este iluzoriu sa ne asteptam la o rezolvare "tehnica" a actualei dispute. Solutia la razboiul politic nu poate fi decat tot politica. Altfel, vom continua sa vedem cum USL-istii si basistii se ameninta reciproc cu puscaria si merg pana in panzele albe intr-un razboi total, pe viata si pe moarte, in care eventualele decizii nefavorabile ale institutiilor statului sunt vazute doar ca obstacole care trebuie depasite.

Amanarea verdictului CCR asupra referendumului ar trebui, de aceea, vazuta ca o oportunitate, poate ultima, oferita politicienilor de a gasi o solutie politica pentru iesirea din criza actuala. Orice va decide CCR pe 12 septembrie, este de asteptat ca una sau alta dintre tabere sa conteste, rezultatul fiind o si mai accentuata decredibilizare a democratiei in Romania, a capacitatii acestei tari de a se autoguverna. Ragazul de sase saptamani ar trebui folosit nu doar pentru verificarea listelor electorale de catre institutiile publice abilitate, ci si pentru pregatirea unor solutii politice in diferitele scenarii posibile dupa 12 septembrie; altfel, vom ajunge de unde am plecat si oricine ramane la putere va avea o grava problema de credibilitate si legitimitate.

Pentru ca o solutie politica sa fie posibila, sunt cateva conditii de baza:

Soarta Romaniei la ruleta politicienilor jucatori (RO)

Cand scriu aceste randuri, nu este clar daca pragul de participare impus de Curtea Constitutionala pentru validarea referendumului de demitere a lui Traian Basescu din functia de presedinte al Romaniei va fi atins. Speranta mea este ca pragul sa fie depasit si referendumul sa fie validat - situatia contrara ar crea enorm de multe probleme si ar putea da lovitura de gratie unei democratii deja grav ranite.
In acelasi timp, judecata rece imi spune ca rezultatul cel mai probabil, conform tendintei din ultimele ore, este o participare la vot sub 45% pana la inchiderea urnelor, atragand invalidarea referendumului si revenirea lui Basescu la Cotroceni.

Dar, indiferent de ce se va intampla, ceea ce voi scrie mai jos isi pastreaza valabilitatea.